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INTRODUCTION
According to the World Health Organisation and
UNICEF, an estimated 768 million people do not
have access to sufficient and safe water for domestic
use and 2.6 billion people lack access to improved
sanitation facilities.1 By 2025 the number of people
directly affected by problems in access to sufficient
and safe water is likely to be increased to three to
five billion.2 The persisting shortcomings in access
to water and sanitation are mainly attributed to
social inequalities.3
The legal norms governing the distribution of water
are an integral part of the complex pattern of factors
that influence how access to water is determined. In
order to ensure access to water for all people and
sustainable resource management, governments all
over the world have come under public pressure to
reform existing water laws. Claims that water should
be used in the interest of the public play a key role
in the debate surrounding water distribution. This
paper follows the idea that water should be used in
the interest of the public. From a legal point of view
the paper examines what the notion of ‘public
interest’ actually means: it deals with the basic
questions, such as how water regimes are currently
structured and what role the public interest clause
plays therein. It then asks which uses of water are
to be considered as corresponding to the interests of
the public; how competing interests are to be
balanced against each other; and how particularly
vulnerable interests of individual water users and
environmental protection of waters can be attributed
the status of paramount public interests.
The paper is structured in two parts: the first explains
the water law of two countries, Switzerland and
South Africa, in which the public interest clause
plays a key role in water distribution. These
countries were chosen because in both, the public
interest clause is a central pillar of the legal norms
governing water distribution. While their histories
are rooted in the legal dogma of property rights, in
both places important changes in the water law took
place over the course of the twentieth century. Still,
water is governed through centuries-old legal
structures in Switzerland, whereas South Africa’s
water law is considered the role model for
contemporary water management. It is the
simultaneity of differences and similarities that
enriches the comparative discussion of the public
interest clause.
A close look at the notion of ‘water distribution in
the public interest’ reveals important insights: water
distribution in the public interest equals the
balancing of a variety of different economic,
ecological and social interests. In the process of
balancing it is noticeable that the human right to
water is used as a protective shield to safeguard access
to water. If decisions on water distribution are taken
by balancing different interests, the effective
implementation of the human right to water is
crucial in order to safeguard water for basic human
needs.
In its second part, the paper introduces the human
right to water in international, Swiss and South
African law. It then points out the shortcomings of
the human right to water (in relation to each of the
three legal orders) if employed as a protective shield
for basic water supply requirements in decisions on
water distribution under the public interest clause.
The paper concludes by stressing the need to evolve
the legal protection of basic human needs because
the human right to water — as conceived in
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1 WHO & UNICEF, Progress on Sanitation and Drinking
Water, 2013 Update 3 (Geneva: WHO & UNICEF,
2013). The statistics describe the situation in 2011.
2 See, e.g., Ulrich Beyerlin & Thilo Marauhn, International
Environmental Law 87 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).
3 For evaluations on the reasons for the ‘water crisis’, see
United Nations Development Program, Human
Development Report, Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and
the Global Water Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006); Kassim Kulindwa & Haakon Lein, ‘Water and
Poverty: The Inextricable Link’, in David Hemson et al.
eds, Poverty and Water, Explorations of the Reciprocal
Relationship 1 (London/New York: Zed Books, 2008)
and Joint Report of the Independent Expert on the
Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty,
Magdalena Sepùlveda Cardona, and the Independent
Expert, Catarina de Albuquerque, The Issue of Human
Rights Obligations Related to Access to Safe Drinking
Water and Sanitation, Addendum Mission to Bangladesh,
22 July 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/C/15/55 (2010).
international law, Swiss law and South African law
— does not always meet the requirements to fully
exercise its protective function.
2
WATER DISTRIBUTION IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST IN SWISS AND
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
As a first step in the analysis of water distribution
in the interest of the public, the basic structures of
the legal regimes governing water in Switzerland and
South Africa are laid out. The notion of ‘water
distribution in the public interest’ is a central concept
in both legal orders reviewed in this paper. In a
leading decision in 1929, the Swiss Federal Court
stated that all water use must be in the interest of
the public.4 Also in South Africa, since the major
water law reform of 1998, the public interest clause
is a central pillar of South African water law; all
water must be used in the public interest only.5
The general understanding of water laws serves as
the basis for a more specific analysis of the public
interest clause. Thus the explanations of general
nature on the water laws are followed by a more
specific examination of the public interest clause.
2.1 Water Rights
The Swiss water regime is based on the classic
continental property rights dichotomy: water is
divided into public and private ownership. As a
general rule, rivers, lakes and large groundwater
basins are owned by the public (namely the Cantonal
governments, or, exceptionally, the municipalities).
Small streams and groundwater basins of limited size
are subject to the private property of landowners.
This is an expression of the principle of accessoriness,
according to which the ownership of the soil implies
everything that is above and below it.6
In 1929, the Swiss Federal Court limited the principle
of accessoriness in regard to water flowing under
the soil of privately owned land. The Federal Court
upheld the dichotomy of private and public property
rights in water, but limited the scope of private
property rights in groundwater to a mediocre
amount. Only public control over water — so the
reasoning of the Federal Court went — can ensure
that the use of water is in the interest of the public.
By excluding groundwater streams from the private
ownership of the landowners, the Federal Court
sought to acknowledge the importance of water for
the public.7 As a result, Swiss water law leaves little
room for private property in water; this means that
most water resources in Switzerland are in the public
domain. This also means that the majority of private
water users are built upon a legal relation between
the user and the state. Only a small amount of water
users can derive individual user rights directly and
without interference by the administration —
excepting the laws on environmental protection —
from their status as landowner.
The South African water regime was originally based
on the civil law dichotomy of public and private
property, in combination with riparian rights
derived from common law. The South African
Water Conservation Act 8 of 1912 divided water into
public and private waters. Spring water and water
flowing over land belonged —analogous to the
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4 BGE 55 I 397 401, Swiss Federal Court, Judgement of 15
November 1929.
5 National Water Act 36 of 1998, Section 3 (1), South
Africa, 398 Government Gazette 19182 [hereafter NWA]
and South African Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry, White Paper on a National Water Policy for
South Africa, para 5.1.2 (DWAF, 1997) [hereafter White
Paper NWA].
6 Swiss Federal Civil Code 1907, Article 704, Recueil
Systématique 210.
7 BGE 55 I 397 400 ff, note 4 above, confirmed in BGE 65
II 143 149 f, Swiss Federal Court, Judgement of 3 March
1939 and BGE 68 II 14, Swiss Federal Court, Judgement
of 26 February 1942. For comments on the reform, see
Peter Hänni, ‘Eigentumsschutz, Sozialbindung und
Enteignung bei der Nutzung von Boden und Umwelt’
51 VVDStRL 252, 263 (1992) and Peter Liver, ‘Die
Entwicklung des Wasserrechts in der Schweiz seit hundert
Jahren’ Festgabe zum Centenarium der Zeitschrift für
schweizerisches Recht 305, 315 (Basel: Helbing &
Lichtenhahn, 1952).
regulation in the Swiss Civil Code — as private water
to the landowner. Water in large streams was public
and regulated by the state, but riparians had a right
to use such water according to their needs. The legal
situation was largely maintained when the Water
Act 54 of 1956 was introduced. Access to and use of
water was tightly linked to land ownership. Such
ownership was restricted to the white population
by the Land Act of 1913 and the Bantu Authority
Act of 1952. The legal structure of water user rights
under the Apartheid regime was discriminatory
throughout and resulted in manifest inequalities in
access to water.8
Since the end of Apartheid, South Africa has
undergone a fundamental change in its water regime.
In 1998, the National Water Act 36 was enacted
(hereafter NWA).9 This law abolished the pre-
existing distinction between public and private
water, introducing the public trust doctrine instead.
All water of the Republic became an indivisible
national asset under public trusteeship. The waters
belong to the people of South Africa. The
government, represented in the person of the
minister, acts as public trustee of the water resources.
The government has no ownership over the water,
but is only its administrator.10 South Africa’s water
law reform has been widely praised as best practice
to implement the right to access to water for all
people and the achievement of sustainable and
integrative water management.11 It is exemplary for
the turn to modern water rights in international
water politics. Also the reform is unique in its
holistic approach to reforming water rights, and the
public interest clause is instrumental therein.
At present, in both Switzerland and South Africa,
competences over access to water are essentially
vested with the decision-making authorities of the
respective states. Decisions on the use and
distribution of water resources are part of the state’s
competences. In Switzerland, most water user rights
depend upon the state’s approval. Water user rights
that are vested in private property and need no state
approval are limited to a marginal amount of water.
In South Africa, such relative rights according to
the law no longer exist. Thus in the last century
private property rights have either been diminished
to a marginal amount of water (Switzerland) or
abolished entirely (South Africa). In both countries
this has been justified with the argument that only
the state is capable of attributing water user rights
in the interest of the public. What it means to
distribute water in the interest of the public is the
subject of the following section.
2.2 The Public Interest Clause
In decisions on the distribution of water, typically
three interests enter into cause: first, the use of water
by individuals and by communities for their basic
water supply; second, the use of water for economic
purposes; and third, the protection of water to
safeguard the environmental health of the watersheds
in question. The worldwide survey conducted by the
World Wildlife Fund shows that 92 per cent of all
water use serves economic interests, of which 70 per
cent are used for agriculture and 22 per cent for
industrial purposes. Only eight per cent of water use
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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8 For details and full references on the legal situation prior
to the water law reform, see Gerrit Pienaar & Elmarie
Van der Schyff, ‘The Reform of Water Rights in South
Africa’ 3/2 Law Environment and Development Journal
179 (2007); Friedrich Soltau, ‘Environmental Justice,
Water Rights and Property’ Acta Juridica 229, 237 (1999);
Robyn Stein, ‘Water Law in a Democratic South Africa:
A Country Case Study Examining the Introduction of a
Public Rights System’ 83 Texas L. Rev. 2167 (2005);
Michael Kidd, Environmental Law 64 f (Cape Town: Juta,
2nd ed. 2008); Jan Glazewski, Environmental Law in
South Africa 429 ff (Durban: LexisNexis, 2nd ed. 2005);
White Paper NWA, note 5 above, Introduction, notes
2.2.5 and 5.1.1 and Andre van der Walt, Property in the
Margins 18 (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009).
9 See NWA, note 5 above.
10 Ibid. See also Sienne Movik & Fieke de Jong, ‘Licence to
Control: Implications of Introducing Administrative
Water User Rights in South Africa’ 7/2 Law Environment
and Development Journal 66, 71 f (2011).
11 See Pienaar & Van der Schyff, note 8 above; Loretta Feris,
‘The Public Trust Doctrine and Liability for Historic
Water Pollution in South Africa’ 8/1 Law Environment
and Development Journal 11 ff (2012); Stein, note 8 above;
Lee Godden, ‘Governing Common Resources:
Environmental Markets and Property in Water’, in
Aileen McHarg et al. eds, Property and the Law in Energy
and Natural Resources 413 (Oxford/New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010) and Christo De Coning,
‘Overview of the Water Policy Process in South Africa’
8 Water Policy 505 (2006).
is for private households and communities.12 While
the numbers describe the factual situation, this section
explores different facets of the legal content of the
public interest clause, such as which uses of water
are to be considered as corresponding to the interests
of the public; how competing interests are to be
balanced against each other; and how particularly
vulnerable water users can be attributed preferential
treatment in this process. Again, the comparative
approach to the legal orders of Switzerland and South
Africa is instrumental in illustrating the public
interest clause. In both countries, decisions on water
distribution are embedded in a legal structure that
allows for dynamic distribution patterns. I call them
dynamic because the decision-makers have significant
discretion in deciding what public interests are at
stake and how they are to be balanced against each
other. This dynamic nature is characteristic of the
distribution of water in the public interest and will
be the subject of the following section. In contrast,
the legal situation in both countries differs
considerably, not least because only the South
African Constitution accords explicit constitutional
protection to basic water needs.
While it is difficult to define the notion of public
interest in a general and abstract manner, it is
possible to define the public interests at stake in the
context of a particular decision to be taken.13 From
a legal point of view, public interests are defined by
two elements: legal norms and case law. The
following two sub-sections analyse these two
elements: the first, which I named the positivist
element of the public interest clause, and the second,
named the casuistic element.
2.2.1 The Positivist Element of the Public Interest
Clause
The interests that can be considered as public in a
given case are not open-ended. The eligible public
interests are first of all defined by the relevant norms
in place in the respective national legal order. This
factor is what can be named the ‘positivist element’
of the public interest clause. Through their decisions,
the legislator or — for case law — the judiciary limit
the decision-maker’s latitude when interpreting the
public interest clause. In both Switzerland and South
Africa the notion of water distribution in the public
interest is specified in more detail by the legal and
constitutional norms governing water, construction
law, environmental law, or even procedural
standards. The leeway of the administration to take
decisions based on the public interest clause is
therefore first of all restricted by all pertinent legal
norms of the respective jurisdiction.
In Switzerland for example, both the law on the use
of hydraulic forces as well as the law on the
protection of water set up a catalogue of legitimate
public interests to be considered by the decision-
makers.14 In Switzerland interests that are to be
considered by the administration are namely: the
public interests of the water user; the economic
interests of the region and the water user; the energy
supply; environmental interests in protecting the
landscape, the water quality, as well as animals and
plants; future water use for drinking water supply;
and agricultural water use.15 Additionally,
hydropower stations under specific circumstances
enjoy absolute protection of their water use as their
economic production is protected by so-called
Water Distribution in Public Interest and Human Right to Water - A Comparative Study
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12 World Wildlife Fund Switzerland, Der Fussabdruck der
Schweiz, Ein Gesamtbild der Wasserabhängigkeit der
Schweiz 9, 15 f (Zürich: DEZA, 2012).
13 In the international context, see Mario Martini, Der Markt
als Instrument hoheitlicher Verteilungslenkung 189
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008) and Lorenzo Cotula,
Human Rights, Natural Resource and Investment Law in a
Globalised World 93 (New York: Routledge, 2012). For
Switzerland, see Martin Philipp Wyss, Öffentliche Interessen
– Interessen der Öffentlichkeit? Das öffentliche Interesse im
schweizerischen Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 2, 16 (Bern:
Schulthess, 2001); Ulrich Häfelin, Georg Müller & Felix
Uhlmann, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht 538 (Zürich/St.
Gallen: Schulthess, 6th ed., 2010) and Alain Griffel, Die
Grundprinzipien des schweizerischen Umweltrechts 326
(Zürich: Schulthess, 2001). For South Africa, see Ziyad
Motala & Cyril Ramaphosa, Constitutional Law, Analysis
and Cases 306 f (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
For cases, see decisions by the Swiss Federal Court in BGE
136 I 1 8, Swiss Federal Court, Judgement of 13 January
2010, BGE 136 I 17 26, Swiss Federal Court, Judgement of
23 November 2009 and BGE 106 Ia 267 271 f, Swiss Federal
Court, Judgement of 9 May 1980.
14 See Swiss Federal Law on the Protection of Waters 1991,
Article 33 and Article 80 para 2, Recueil Systématique
814.20 [hereafter WPL] and Swiss Federal Law on the
Use of Hydraulic Forces 1916, Article 22, Recueil
Systématique 721.80 [hereafter HFL].
15 Id .
in compliance with its positivist element, the legal
norms, is the subject of the following complementary
sub-section.
2.2.2 The Casuistic Element of the Public Interest Clause
The decision taken by the competent authority is
not only determined by the positivistic element —
the relevant legal norms — but also implies a casuistic
element. The application of the public interest clause
to the facts underlying a particular decision to be
taken lies first of all with the competence of the
administration and only in case of redress with the
judiciary. In the decisional phase of water
distribution, the decision-maker cannot just take any
decision that pleases him, but is limited not only by
the relevant legal norms (as explained in section 2.1.
above) but also by the rules applicable to their
interpretation. The methodologically structured
process of decision-making is what is meant by the
casuistic element of the public interest clause in this
paper. The process of identifying, evaluating and
weighing of relevant interests is structured by the
predefined methodology, acting as a barrier to the
arbitrariness of the decisional process.
It is in this context of identifying, evaluating and
weighing of relevant interests under the public
interest clause that the principle of sustainable
development is of importance. The principle of
sustainable development is an integral part of Swiss
and South African jurisprudence.21 According to
‘acquired rights’ (in German ‘wohlerworbene
Rechte’) against interference by other water user’s
legitimate interests.16
In South Africa, the NWA states that the protection
of the environment and of basic human needs are
public interests of absolute priority if balanced
against other interests at stake.17 The NWA also
contains a list of relevant factors to be taken into
account by the authority when issuing a general
authorisation or water user licence.18 Relevant
interests mentioned in the South African NWA
(section 27) include for example the need to redress
the results of past racial and gender discrimination;
efficient and beneficial use of water in the public
interest; the socio-economic impact of the water use;
the likely effect of the water use on the water
resource and on other water users; the quantity of
water in the water resource which may be required
for the Reserve and for meeting international
obligations; and the investments already made and
to be made by the water user in respect of the water
use in question.19
These norms therefore significantly limit the
legitimate interests; sometimes they even oblige the
decision-makers to attribute priority to certain
interests. While some norms establish a specific
catalogue of public interests or even set up a priority
list, other norms simply oblige the decision-maker
to consider all relevant public interests at stake
without any further specification.20 Still, both types
of legal norms — those that specify particular
interests and those that merely oblige the decision-
makers to consider all relevant interests at stake —
leave a more or less broad range of discretion to the
decision-maker. According to which scheme the
decision-makers interpret the public interest clause
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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16 See HFL, note 14 above, Article 43; BGE 107 Ib 140 149 f,
Swiss Federal Court, Judgement of 17 June 1981 and BGE
110 Ib 160 165, Swiss Federal Court, Judgement of 28
February 1984. On acquired rights in Swiss law, see Häfelin,
Müller & Uhlmann, note 13 above, paras 1008 ff.
17 See NWA, note 5 above, Section 1 (1) (xviii) in
conjunction with section 16.
18 Id., Section 27.
19 For a detailed description of the licensing procedure in
South Africa, see Movik & de Jong, note 10 above, at 73 ff.
20 See, e.g., Swiss Federal Law on Land Use Planning 1979,
Article 24, Recueil Systématique 700.
21 For Switzerland, see Swiss Federal Constitution 1999,
Article 2 para 2 and Article 73, Recueil systématique 101
[hereafter Swiss Const.]; Swiss Federal Law on
Environmental Protection 1983, Article 1 para 1, Recueil
Systématique 814.01; WPL, note 14 above, Article 1;
Griffel, note 13 above, at 16 f, 22, 27 and Ulrich Häfelin,
Walter Haller & Helen Keller, Schweizerisches
Bundesstaatsrecht paras 187 ff (Zürich, Basel & Geneva:
Schulthess, 8th ed. 2012). For South Africa, see
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996
[hereafter SA Const.], section 24 (b) (iii); South African
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998,
33306 Government Gazette  547 [hereafter NEMA],
section 2 (3); BP Southern Africa v. MEC for Agriculture,
Conservation Environment and Land Affairs, High Court
of South Africa (Witwatersrand Local Division),
Judgement of 31 March 2004, 2004 (5) SA 124 (W)
[hereafter BP v. MEC], para 144; Glazewski, note 8 above,
at 80 ff and Kidd, note 8 above, at 16 f.
current knowledge, the relationship between the
interests in safeguarding healthy watersheds and the
man-made use of water is key to secure access to
water in the long term.22 This idea is expressed in
the principle of sustainable development. In both
legal orders, the principle of sustainable development
has no predefined legal content, but merely obliges
the decision-maker to first consider the relevant
interests, and second balance them against each other
so as to safeguard the environmental health of the
watersheds.23 The principle of sustainable
development thus sets a specific methodological
procedure to be followed by the decision-makers.
The principle of sustainable development is made
effective through the procedure of compulsory
licensing. In both Switzerland and South Africa, any
water use that goes beyond the mere occasional
satisfaction of the most basic needs is subject to
retrieve a licence from the administration.24 The aim
of the compulsory licensing system is to ensure that
only those water users whose water use is in the
interest of the public are granted a licence. The
administration succumbs to the task of determining
which water use corresponds to the interests of the
public and which one does not for each specific case.
To fulfil its duty, the administration usually proceeds
in two steps: First, it identifies all potential users
and their relevant interests at stake. As noted, the
most common interests in water use are for
agricultural, industrial or domestic purposes, as well
as water needed to maintain the ecological balance
of the watershed in question. At this stage of the
procedure, the choice of interests to be considered
by the administration might also be limited by the
relevant legal norms applicable to the case. In a
second step, the administration attributes values to
the public interests at stake and weights them against
each other to arrive at its decision.25
Two primordial differences between the South
African and the Swiss procedure of licensing are
crucial to the topic of this paper: first, in both
Switzerland and South Africa water law is based
upon the logic of residual water flow quota. This
vision of environmental protection of water
resources is firmly rooted in the belief that science
has enabled mankind to take control over natural
resources and manage them in a ‘sustainable’ manner
through calculations of residual quantities to be
attributed to nature, offering a quantifiable free yield
to humans in control.26 In South Africa, the residual
flow quota is called the ‘Reserve’. The Reserve
destined to protect the waters and the Reserve
destined to protect the domestic water needs enjoy
absolute protection.27 The Reserve is identified in
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22 See Beyerlin & Marauhn, note 2 above, at 87; Philippe
Cullet, ‘Water Law in a Globalised World: The Need for
a New Conceptual Framework’ 23 J. of Env. L. 233, 234
f (2011) (with references to the relevant publications of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC));
Report of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, The Relationship
between Climate Change and Human Rights, 15 January
2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (2009), para 29 [hereafter
Climate Change Report HCHR]; United Nations
Development Program, Human Development Report,
Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided
World 94 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007/08);
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Environmental Degradation’, in
Daniel Moeckli et al. eds, International Human Rights
Law 622, 623 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010);
Richard Hiskes, ‘Missing the Green: Golf Course
Ecology, Environmental Justice, and Local ‘Fulfilment’
of the Human Right to Water’ 32 HR Quart. 326, 339
(2010) and Antoinette Hildering, International Law,
Sustainable Development and Water Management 28 ff
(Delft: Eburon Publ, 2004). On the relationship between
climate change and water occurrences in Switzerland, see
Bundesamt für Umwelt, Auswirkungen der
Klimaänderung auf Wasserressourcen und Gewässer,
Synthesebericht zum Projekt ‘Klimaänderung und
Hydrologie in der Schweiz’ (Bern: BAFU, 2012).
23 For Switzerland, see Griffel, note 13 above at 11; Vallender,
‘St. Galler Kommentar zu Art. 73 BV’, in Bernhard
Ehrenzeller et al. eds, Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung,
Kommentar paras 30 ff (Zürich & St. Gallen: Dike &
Schulthess, 2nd ed., 2008) and BGE 132 II 305 319 f, Swiss
Federal Court, Judgement of 11 April 2006. For South
Africa, see Glazewski, note 8 above, at 14 f, 80 ff; Kidd,
note 8 above, at 16 f and BP vs MEC, note 21 above.
24 For Switzerland, see WPL,  note 14 above, Article 29.
For South Africa, see NWA, note 5 above, Chapter 4
and schedule 1. In both the countries the use of small
amounts of water is exempt of the compulsory licensing
system. The supply of domestic water users by water
supply services does not fall within this category and is
subject to compulsory licensing.
25 See, e.g., BGE 120 Ib 233 240, Swiss Federal Court,
Judgement of 24 August 1994.
26 On the historical origins of the ideology of scientific
conservation, see Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism,
A Global History 25-43 (New York: Longman, 2000).
27 See NWA, note 5 above, Chapter 1, Section 1 (xviii) and
Part 3.
an independent procedure prior to the licencing
procedure. In this separate procedure the minister
has to follow clear guidelines when determining the
Reserve.28 In the licencing procedure itself, the
Reserve is one factor amongst others to be considered
by the administration. But as its quantity is already
predetermined it should normally remain untouched
in the licensing procedure.29 By contrast, in
Switzerland the quantification of the residual flow
quota and licencing take place in the same
procedure.30 While standardised residual flow quotas
exist, the Swiss water protection law foresees certain
exceptions thereto. Thus the decision-maker can
decide to increase or decrease the residual flow quota
according to his assessment of the interests at stake.
Considerable decisive power in the determination
of the residual flow quota succumbs to the
administration within the licensing procedure.31
Consequently while the regulation of the procedures
under the public interest clause in Switzerland and
South Africa is similar, one important difference is
the level of statute law: In South Africa, the Reserve
by law out values any other water user. In
Switzerland, water use for drinking water supply or
the safeguard to environmental health is one interest
to be balanced amongst others within the same
procedure. The preceding statement should not
deceive the fact that in South Africa water supply
services still have to undergo the authorisation or
licencing procedure. And because no particular legal
protection is attributed to their interests on statutory
level, their interests are balanced against other
interests by the administration.
This brings us to the second paramount difference
between Swiss and South African decision-making
under the public interest clause: in both legal orders,
special attention is attributed to domestic water users
and the environment. Thus the administration has a
duty to consider domestic water users or the
environment as important public interests at stake.
But no particular right attributed to these users is to
be treated preferentially over any other interest on
statutory level. The insecurity in regard to the
statutory law is increased by the fact that the interests
Law, Environment and Development Journal
of domestic water users are neither in Switzerland,
nor in South Africa mentioned as trumping per se
any other water user’s interests. This seems odd in
regard of the primordial importance of water for
human and environmental health. Reason for this
absence of explicit legal valuation in Switzerland is,
to speculate about, simply the absence of significant
pressure on drinking water supply. It might also be
the expression of a kind of implicit confidence that
the interests in drinking water supply anyhow out
value any other water user’s interests. In South Africa
the absence of legal guarantee for domestic water
users in statutory law can be explained by their
explicit protection on constitutional level. In the
South African water law reform statutory water law
and constitutional guarantees where designed to
complement each other.
Thus the human right to water’s role in the process
of water distribution under the public interest clause
is to guarantee the priority of such water use if
competing against other interests at stake. While the
South African water law is conceptually interlocked
with the constitutionally guaranteed human right to
water, such an explicit connection is absent in Swiss
statutory law. The need for constitutional
complement of the Swiss statutory water laws has
been illustrated in a case decided by the
Administrative Court of the Canton of Fribourg: The
Administrative court had to weigh the economic
interests of the private owner of a water source against
the public interests of the community to use the water
for the domestic water supply of its inhabitants.
While the interests of the owner where
constitutionally protected by the right to property
from state interference (article 26 Swiss Const.), the
community itself had no explicit constitutional right
to base its claims on. In a leading decision, the
Administrative Court from its own initiative
accorded preferential treatment to the domestic water
users based on the fundamental right to emergency
assistance as guaranteed in the Swiss Federal
Constitution.32 The Administrative Court was the
first Swiss court ever to apply the right to emergency
assistance as a constitutional norm to protect the
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28 On the procedure, Id., Section 16.
29 See NWA, note 5 above, Section 16 in conjunction with
section 27 (1) (j).
30 See WPL, note 14 above, Article 33.
31 Id., Articles 31-33.
32 Swiss Const., note 21 above, Article 12 and C Waeber c
Direction des Institutions de l’Agriculture et des Forêts du
Canton the Fribourg et Commune de Barberêche 17 ff, 2nd
Administrative Court of the Canton of Fribourg,
Judgement of 1 September 2009 [hereafter Waeber].
domestic water supply against other water user’s
interests. The case illustrates the necessity to
complement the Swiss statutory law with a further
reaching protection for domestic water users. In light
of this comparison between Switzerland and South
Africa, thus, the function of the human right to water
with regard to the public interest clause comes into
play: the human right to water is crucial in decisions
on water distribution under the public interest clause
to guarantee the priority of such water use if
competing against other interests at stake.
Summing up, the procedure of water distribution
in the public interest can be characterised as follows:
the competences for decisions on water distribution
in Switzerland and South Africa are vested with the
state; the content of the public interest clause is
determined by the positivist and casuistic elements;
and the public interests that come into play are
manifold. In the case to case procedure of balancing
competing interests, it is crucial that the interests of
domestic water users and the environment are
attributed priority by law. In the South African and
Swiss legal orders water supply is listed as an
important public interests. The administration is
obliged to consider water supply as an important
public interest, but neither absolute priority to
domestic water users, nor justiciable rights to be
treated with priority are guaranteed thereby. Thus
while the normative function of the public interest
clause is to guarantee that water is exclusively used
in the public interest, the normative function of the
human right to water is to guarantee that in the
process of water distribution priority is attributed
to water use for domestic purposes. The public
interest clause with the human right to water
together oblige the administration to attribute
priority to the interests of domestic water users. The
administration must not only consider the domestic
water supply as public interest, but must also treat
such an interest as obliging if compared against other
potential water users’ interests. The human right to
water is thus an important complement to the public
interest clause if basic human needs are to be
attributed priority and legal protection.33
Having identified the interaction between the public
interest clause and the human right to water as being
necessary complementary, the questions remains
whether this protective function can actually be filled
by the human right to water as conceived in the
relevant legal orders. Thus the next part of the paper
focuses on whether the human right to water, as
conceived in South African, Swiss and international
law, is actually apt to fill the protective function within
the public interest clause to an extent found necessary in
view of the paramount importance of the public interest
in domestic water supply and environmental protection.
3
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AS
PROTECTIVE SHIELD IN SWISS,
SOUTH AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The normative function of the public interest clause
is to guarantee that water is used in the public interest
only. The normative function of the human right
to water is to ensure that in this process absolute
priority is attributed to water use for domestic
purposes. The human right to water thus enters
decisions on water distribution under the public
interest clause as the protective shield for domestic
water need. Legitimate expectation is thus, that the
human right to water is sufficiently stringent so as
to attribute priority and protection to basic human
needs in any decision that might affect such water
use. To fulfil its protective function, the human right
to water must attribute not only a duty to treat such
water users preferentially, but also an individual
right to be treated preferentially. As such, the human
right to water must assume a dual protective function
as a governmental duty and as an individual right.
In this part of the paper the centre of attention is
drawn upon the protective function of the human
right to water. The question is whether the human
right to water — as conceived in Swiss, South African
and international law — is capable of fulfilling its
protective function against competing water demands.
To answer this question attention is devoted to those
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33 For Switzerland, see Swiss Const., note 21 above, Article
76 para 3 and WPL, note 14 above, Article 1 and 29. For
South Africa, NEMA, note 21 above, Section 2 (4) and
3, NWA, note 5 above, Chapter 4 and schedule 1.
aspects of the human right to water that critically
affect its capacity to work as protective shield against
competing interests. The shortcomings of the human
right to water as protective shield can be placed within
three categories: the first relates to the concept of
the human right to water as minimal guarantee; the
second concerns the unequal protection of different
categories of domestic water users; the third stands in
relation to the inherent anthropocentricity of the human
right to water. Each section introduces the legal
structure of the human right to water in Swiss, South
African and international law and points out the
resulting shortcomings of the human right to water
in its function as protective shield for domestic water
needs in decisions on water distribution under the
public interest clause. Finally, the outcomes of this
section confirm the thesis of this paper according to
which human right to water – as conceived in Swiss,
South African and international law – is not always
sufficiently stringent to ensure the protective function
with which it is attributed in the respective legal orders.
Before entering the discussion, two preliminary
remarks have to be added. First, the choice to include
international law in the second part of this paper is
determined by the object of investigation: on the one
side, the regulation of water as a natural resource is a
matter of national sovereignty (with the exception
of international environmental law) and thus
regulated by national law. On the other side, the state
by subscribing to international human rights treaties
loses its tradition to treat its citizens as it sees fit.34
Thus international human rights law simply cannot
be ignored when entering the debate on the role of
the human right to water in water distribution under
the public interest clause. Attitudes of Switzerland
and South Africa towards its international obligations
derived of the human right to water differ
considerably: while Switzerland has ratified the
Convention and is also in favour of the recognition
of the human right to water, it refuses to consider
the rights guaranteed therein as individual rights.
Besides repeated objection by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereafter
ESCR Committee], the Swiss government considers
most of the provisions of the Covenant merely as
programmatic objectives and social goals rather than
legal obligations.35 South Africa has not yet ratified
the treaty and is thus not bound by any norms of the
Convention that are not part of customary law. The
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of
constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic rights
deviates deliberately from the Committee’s
interpretation of the Covenant.36
The second preliminary remark concerns the
diverging nature of the legal basis of the right to
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34 Walter Kälin & Jörg Künzli, The Law of International
Human Rights Protection 16, 185 (New York/Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009) and James Nickel, Making
Sense of Human Rights 36 (Malden/Oxford/Victoria:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd ed. 2007). According to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, every treaty in force
must be performed by a state in good faith. A state may
not invoke its internal law as a justification for its failure
to perform a treaty, articles 26 and 27 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS
331 (1980). With regard to the implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has issued General Comment No. 9, The Domestic
Application of the Covenant, Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24
(1998) [hereafter GC 9]. Therein (para 1) the Committee
has elaborated that the Covenant adopts a ‘broad and
flexible approach, which enables the particularities of the
legal and administrative systems of each State, as well as
other relevant considerations, to be taken into account’.
35 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Switzerland,  UN Doc. E/C.12/CHE/
CO/2-3, 26. November 2010. For an overview of the
Swiss Federal Court’s case law on the matter see Thomas
Hugi Yar, ‘Die Praxis des Bundesgerichts im Bereich der
wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Rechte’
Jusletter (3 Dezember 2012).
36 Notably the Constitutional Court has rejected the ESCR
Committee’s concept of justiciable minimal content,
Heinz Klug, The Constitution of South Africa, A
Contextual Analysis 144 f (Oxford/Portland: Hart
Publishing, 2010); Danie Brand, ‘Introduction in Socio-
Economic Rights in the South African Constitution’, in
Danie Brand & Christof Heyns eds, Socio-Economic
Rights in South Africa 49 ff (Pretoria: Pretoria University
Law Press, 2005); Government of South Africa and others
v Irene Grootboom and Others ,  South African
Constitutional Court, Judgement of 4 October 2000,
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 (11) BCLE 1169 (CC) [hereafter
Grootboom (CC)], paras [39 ff], [64 ff], [99]; Minister of
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and
Others, Judgement of 5 July 2002, 2002 (4) BCLR 356
(T) [hereafter TAC (CC)] and Mazibuko and Others v City
of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and
Evictions as Amicus Curiae) ,Constitutional Court of
South Africa, Judgement of 8 October 2009, CCT 39/09
[hereafter Mazibuko (CC)], paras [67], [91 ff], [98 ff].
CESCR in regard of the human right to water.41
This paper therefore accepts articles 11 and 12
CESCR as binding legal basis of the human right to
water in international law.42 Similarly to the
Convention, the human right to water is not
mentioned explicitly in the Swiss Constitution, but
implicitly contained in the right to emergency
assistance as guaranteed by article 12 of the Swiss
Constitution. As the right guarantees satisfaction of
the most basic human needs, its protection of
fundamental material goods such as food, clothes,
shelter and water is undisputed.43 In comparison,
the South African Constitution is famous for its
justiciable socio-economic rights.44 The human right
to water is guaranteed by section 27 (1) (b) of the SA
Constitution and thus its legal basis is undisputed.
Consequently in both Switzerland and South Africa,
the human right to water is guaranteed in the
respective constitutions, although in very different
form. Additionally, Switzerland is bound by the
Covenant, while South Africa is not.45
water in the three legal orders: in international law,
the human right to water has not been mentioned
explicitly in any of the three documents that
constitute the Universal Bill of Human Rights.37
Whether the human right to water is implicitly
contained in articles 11 para 1 and 12 para 2 CESCR
is still subject of dispute.38 A series of important
events – namely the publication of General
Comment No. 15 on the right to water (hereafter
GC 15) by the UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (hereafter ESCR Committee)39
and the resolutions of the UN Human Rights
Council and the UN General Assembly
promulgating the right to safe and clean water and
sanitation40 – have step by step led to broad ranging
acceptance of the inclusive interpretation of the
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37 The following three documents are considered to form
the Universal Bill of Human Rights: the UN General
Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UN
Doc. A/810/71 (1948) [hereafter UDHR]; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3
(1976) [hereafter CESCR] and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999
UNTS 171 (1976) [hereafter CCPR].
38 The human right to water is also partly based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, namely the right
to life and human dignity (articles 1 and 3 UDHR, id.).
The ESCR Committee also underlined that the right to
water has been recognised in a wide range of international
documents, such as the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women or the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. For full
references, see General Comment No. 15, The Right to
Water (articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/
C.12/2002/11 (2002) [hereafter GC 15], para 3 f.
39 As the ESCR Convention constitutes the most important
legal basis for the right to water in international law, I
will base my reflections and assumptions on the
Convention and the interpretation the ESCR Committee
has given it in GC 15.
40 UN Human Rights Council Resolution 16/2, Human
Right to Water and Sanitation, 8 April 2011, UN Doc.
A/HRC/Res/16/2 (2011); UN Human Rights Council
Resolution 15/9, Human Rights and Access to Safe
Drinking Water and Sanitation, 6 October 2010, UN
Doc. A/HRC/Res/15/9 (2010) and UN General
Assembly Resolution 64/292, The Human Right to
Water and Sanitation, 3 August 2010, UN Doc. A/Res/
64/292 (2010).
41 The teleological interpretation of articles 11 and 12
CESCR by the ESCR Committee in GC 15 has not been
accepted by all parties to the Convention. They have
mainly based their opposition on a literal interpretation
of the Covenant. See Matthew Craven, ‘Some Thoughts
on the Emergent Right to Water’, in Eibe Riedel & Peter
Rothen eds, The Human Right to Water 37 (Berlin: BWV
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006).
42 The case is researched and argued for in detail in Vanessa
Rüegger, Der Zugang zu Wasser als Verteilungsfrage, Das
Verhältnis zwischen dem Menschenrecht auf Wasser und den
Herrschafts- und Nutzungsrechten an Wasservorkommen
111-139 (Zürich, Basel & Geneva: Schulthess, 2013).
43 See Margrith Bigler-Eggenberger, ‘Art. 12 BV’, in
Ehrenzeller et al., note 23 above and Guillaume Grisel
& Pierre Mercier, ‘La mise en œuvre du droit à l’eau, Le
cas de la Suisse’, in Guillaume Grisel ed, La mise en œuvre
du droit à l’eau 416 (Geneva, Zurich & Basel: Schulthess,
2006). Until now, no judgement on the matter has been
issued by the Swiss Federal Court, see Waeber, note 32
above, 17, 2.c: ‘La mesure litigeuse vise à fournir de l’eau
potable à la commune afin que cette dernière puisse
desservir à son tour les douze ménages raccordés à son
réseau, qui à défaut seraient privés du droit fondamental
de bénéficier de conditions minimales d’existence’.
44 See, e.g. ,  Cass Sunstein,  Designing Democracy, What
Constitutions Do 221 ff (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001). See also Klug, note 36 above, at 113, 132.
45 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights is in force for Switzerland since 18
September 1992 (see Recueil Systématique 0.103.1). South
Africa has signed the Convention on 3 October 1994,
but not yet ratified it.
3.1 Legal Content
The first critical limitation of the human right as
protective shield derives from the fact that the right
to water by its very concept is limited to a minimal
protection of water for basic human needs only. Its
content is therefore by definition limited to a
minimum. As such, the human right to water takes
on an important role as protective shield in decisions
on water distribution. At the same time the
protection of water for human needs remains limited
to this very minimum. No further claims within the
public interest clause (e.g. for more far reaching
social redistribution of water) can be derived from
the human right to water.
Additionally, the legal content of the human right
to water has been interpreted restrictively in all three
legal orders analysed in this paper, thus further
limiting its protective potential if employed as
protective shield in decisions on water distribution.
In international law, the interpretation by the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
in General Comment No. 15 is particularly narrow
and explicit. By adopting this narrow and explicit
approach, the Committee’s intent was to facilitate
the acceptance and implementation of the human
right to water by state parties. Whether the
Committee has succeeded in its strategy is beside the
point of this paper; what matters is that by this
approach, the Committee has limited the protective
potential of the human right to water. The
Committee has defined the normative content of the
right to water as the entitlement of everyone to
sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and
affordable water for personal and domestic uses.46
The WHO has quantified reasonable access as being
the availability of at least 20 litres per person per
day from a source within one kilometre of the user’s
dwelling.47 This precision of a specific quantity of water
stands in contradiction to the fact that the human right
to water in international law is derived from the right
to an adequate standard of life. Thus its normative
content includes not only the absolute minimal water
quantity needed for human survival, but also the
relative minimal water quantity needed for an adequate
standard of life. As a relative term, the precise quantity
protected by the word ‘adequate’ can only be determined
according to the circumstances of each case in question.
Another important restriction in international law
that particularly concerns the human right to water’s
protective function is the exclusion of protection for
water used for subsistence farming. In decisions
under the public interests clause, no protection for
water used for subsistence farming can be derived
by reference to the international human right to
water. Constitutional protection for those users is
also lacking in Swiss and South African law. As the
compulsory licensing system is the operationalisation
of water distribution in the public interest and the
human right to water has the function of protecting
the interests that are considered particularly
important against competing interests, the exclusion
of certain water users that depend on water for their
livelihood only warranted by subsistence farming
has important consequences on vulnerable interest
groups. Only those water users whose interests are
backed by a legal norm attributing priority to their
interests can actually claim preferential treatment
in the compulsory licensing system. Of course it can
be said that such users can alternatively base
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47 Jamie Bartram & Howard Guy, Domestic Water Quantity,
Service Level and Health 1 (Geneva: WHO, 2003). The
ESCR Committee also refers to a paper written by Peter
Gleick, in which he quantifies a figure of 50 litres per capita
per day as the basic water requirement for domestic water
supply. See Peter Gleick, ‘Basic Water Requirements for
Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs’ 21 Water Int. 83
(1996). The quality of water should be free of any
substances that constitute a threat to a person’s health.
Water should also be of an acceptable colour, odour and
taste. Water facilities must be within safe physical reach
for all sections of the population and not threaten physical
security. Water must be affordable for all, including direct
and indirect costs and charges. Accessibility also includes
information about concerning water issues. Additionally,
the ESCR Committee pointed out that the normative
content of the right to water has to be interpreted in light
of the principles of sustainability, non-discrimination and
equality. See GC15, note 38 above, paras 11-13.46 See GC 15, note 38 above, para 2.
themselves on the legal protection of their water
needs by the right to food.48 As this might be an
option to be considered in the future, no such
reference has come to the forefront in either
jurisprudence considered in this paper.
Conceptual tensions between absolute and relative
minimal content can also be observed in both South
Africa and Switzerland. Even though South Africa
has not yet ratified the Convention on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,49 the wording of section
27 of the South African Constitution follows closely
the Convention.50 According to section (1) (a) South
African Constitution, everyone has the right to have
access to sufficient water. The normative content of
the South African right to water is specified amongst
other legislation most notably by the Water Services
Act (hereafter WSA). In its section 1 (iii) WSA basic
water supply is defined in close resemblance to the
definition employed in GC 15 as ‘the prescribed
minimum standard of water supply services
necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient
quantity and quality of water to households,
including informal households, to support life and
personal hygiene’.51 Based upon section 9 WSA, the
Department of Water Affairs (hereafter DWAF) has
issued the Free Basic Water Strategy, which sets a
national minimal standard for basic water supply
services. Thus the minimal standard in South Africa
is 25 litres of potable water per person per day or
six kilolitres per household per month.52
In South Africa, the question whether the normative
content of the right to water is limited to the
minimum standard as provided for by the Free Basic
Water Policy or on the contrary encloses a relative
dimension that goes beyond the minimum remains
critical so far. The wording of the Constitution,
which guarantees access to ‘sufficient’ water points
into the direction that the normative content is not
limited to the absolute minimal water quantity as
prescribed in the Free Basic Water Policy. If we are
to follow the logic employed in international law,
the sufficient amount of water as guaranteed by the
South African Constitution protects not only the
absolute, but also the relative minimum of water.
Thus it can only be determined in regard to the
specific needs of each individual. This said, the
Constitutional Court so far has followed a different
line of reasoning and developed a peculiar approach
to the interpretation of the normative content of
sections 26 and 27 the South African Constitution.
By doing so it has limited the determination of the
right’s legal content to the procedural standard of
reasonableness review, evading substantial material
interpretation of the normative content of the
right.53 The Constitutional Court thus has accepted
the Free Basic Water Policy as minimal standard,
but not determined whether section 27 (1) (b) the
South African Constitution protects also the relative
dimension of its material content.
In Switzerland, no specific water quantity protected
by the right to emergency assistance has been
identified by law or jurisprudence. But article 12
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48 The subject is treated by the ESCR Committee in GC
15, note 38 above, para 7.
49 See note 45 above.
50 See Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights,
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution  19
(Claremont: Juta, 2010) and Craig Scott & Alston Philip,
‘Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational
Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and
Grootboom’s Promise’ 16 SAJHR 206 (2000).
51 South African Water Services Act 108 of 1997, 390
Government Gazette 18522 [hereafter WSA].
52 South African DWAF, Free Basic Water Implementation
Strategy Document (2001) [hereafter Free Basic Water
Policy]. The document further specifies, that the minimal
water flow rate must be 10 litres per minute, that the closest
water tap must be not more than 200 metres of a household,
and that no consumer should be without a supply for more
than seven days in any year. For a critical analysis of the
Free Basic Water Policy, see Mike Muller, ‘Free Basic Water
– A Sustainable Instrument for a Sustainable Future in
South Africa’ 20 Environment and Urbanization 67 (2008).
53 See Mazibuko (CC), note 36 above, paras [83 f], [90 ff]. In
contrast, see the substantial interpretation of section 27
(1) (b) by the lower levels of jurisdiction in Mazibuko
and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions as Amicus Curiae) ,
Johannesburg High Court, 4 All SA 471 (W) N 181 and
City of Johannesburg and Others v Mazibuko and Others
(Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as Amicus Curiae),
South African Supreme Court of Appeal, Judgement of
25 March 2009, 2009 (3) SA 592 (SCA), 2009 (8) BCLR
791 (SCA), paras [16]-[24]. For detailed analysis and
further references on the reasonableness review, see
Liebenberg, note 50 above, at 65, 131 ff, 466 ff; David
Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification
and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights 139 ff (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007) and Jackie Dugard,
‘Judging the Judges: Towards an Appropriate Role for
the Judiciary in South Africa’s Transformation’ 20 Leiden
J. of Int. L. 965 (2007).
Swiss Constitution is by its very concept limited to
the protection of the most elemental human needs
only. Even though the protective scope of the right
has to be interpreted in light of the particular
circumstances of each case, its normative content
does not enclose an adequate standard of living, but
only emergency provision of the most fundamental
goods.54 Its normative content is thus already by
the wording of the constitutional norm limited to
the absolute minimum. The normative content of
the right to emergency assistance is narrower than
the normative content of the human right to water,
which protects the vital needs in their relative
dimension.
To understand the significance of the minimal
content for the human right to water’s function as
protective shield it is important to retain that the
human right to water is conceptually limited to the
protection of a minimum. When employed to secure
access to water against competing demands on
resources, no more can be derived of the human right
to water than the protected minimum. This
minimum has been defined in different ways: in
Switzerland only the absolute minimum is
constitutionally protected. In international law, the
protection includes a relative dimension, but its
restrictive interpretation by the ESCR Committee
in GC 15 leaves the legal situation open to discussion.
In South Africa, the wording of the constitutional
norm eludes a relative scope, but the Constitutional
Court so far seems to represent an absolute notion
of protection. Limiting the human right to water to
an absolute minimum also automatically limits its
potential to protect domestic water users against
competing public interests. Thus the scope of
protection is of primordial importance if the human
right to water is employed as place holder for basic
human needs in the public interest clause. In light
of its significance in the legal order, reducing the
human right to water to the absolute minimum (as
is clearly the case in Switzerland) does not seem to
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be responsive. If the human right to water is to be
effective in its protective function under any
circumstances, its normative content should be
considered in a relative dimension.
3.2 Individual Protection
The second critical aspect of the human right to
water’s function as protective shield is whether it
accords protection to every single human being. The
human right to water can only be considered as
reliable protective shield in decisions on water
distribution if it is actually conceived in a manner so
as to attribute protection to every single person under
any circumstances. In this regard an important
shortcoming in international and South African law
prevails: in decisions on water distribution the
protective function of the human right to water —
within its limited normative content — is safeguarded
for the ‘haves’, but fragmentary for the ‘have-nots’.
This is due to the fact that in both legal orders states’
obligations with regard to the human right to water
differ considerably subject to whether an individual
already has access to sufficient water or not.
From a general point of view, the right to water
imposes three types of obligations on state parties:
obligations to respect, obligations to protect and
obligations to fulfil.55 The obligation to respect
54 Walter Schmid, ‘Die Stellung der Sozialhilfe im System
der sozialen Sicherheit’, in Gabriela Riemer-Kafka &
Alexandra Rumo-Jungo eds, Soziale Sicherheit – Soziale
Unsicherheit , Festschrift für Erwin Murer zum 65.
Geburtstag 757, 763 (Bern: Stämpfli Verlag, 2010) and
Kathrin Amstutz, Das Grundrecht auf Existenzsicherung,
Bedeutung und inhaltliche Ausgestaltung des Art. 12 der
neuen Bundesverfassung 142-147 (Bern: Schulthess, 2002).
55 For international law, see GC15, note 38 above, para 20;
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, 22-26 January 1997, para
7; General Comment No. 12, The Right to Adequate Food
(article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5
(1999) [hereafter GC 12] and General Comment No. 14,
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4
(2000) [hereafter GC 14]. See also Brand, note 36 above, at
27 f; George Devenish, The South African Constitution
149ff (Durban: LexisNexis, 2005); Residents of Bon Vista
Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council, High
Court of South Africa, Judgement of September 2001, 2002
(6) BCLR 625 (W) and S v Makwanyane and Another, South
African Constitutional Court, Judgement of 6 June 1995,
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), para [104].
See Rüegger, note 42 above, at 44 (with further references);
BGE 122 I 101 104 ff, Swiss Federal Court, Judgement of
24 May 1996 and Waeber, note 32 above, 17, 2.c.
requires that state parties refrain from interfering
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right
to water, for example polluting water through waste
from state-owned facilities or destroying water
services as a punitive measure. The obligation to
protect requires state parties to prevent third parties
from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of
the right to water, for example inequitably extracting
from water resources or denying others equal access
to water. The obligation to fulfil requires state parties
to adopt the necessary measures directed towards
the full realisation of the right to water, such as
sufficient recognition of this right within the
national political and legal system.56
In all three legal orders taken into account, the state’s
obligation to respect and protect the already existing
water supply is defined as an immediate obligation
of the state. However, in international and in South
African law, the state’s obligation to fulfil the right
to water only encloses an immediate obligation of
the state to take steps towards the fulfilment of the
right. In international law, this is expressed in article
2 para 1 CESCR, according to which: ‘each State
party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, (…) with a view to achieving progressively the
full realisation of the rights recognised in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means(…)’. In South
African law, the progressive realisation of the right
to water is regulated by section 27 (2) of the South
African Constitution: ‘The state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of
each of these rights. ‘Thus no immediate individual
right to be supplied with water can be derived from
the human right to water as currently defined in
international and South African law. In the decision
on the Mazibuko case, the Constitutional Court has
even stated explicitly that no individual right to be
supplied with water can be derived from section 27
(1) (b) of the South African Constitution.57
In contrast to the unequal protection of the haves
and the have-nots in international and South African
law, the Swiss fundamental right to emergency
assistance does give rise to an individual right to be
provided with the most fundamental material goods.
The only prior condition to benefit of the
constitutional right is that the individual is incapable
of providing these goods by his or her own means.
Thus the State has an immediate duty to provide
each individual in need with the most fundamental
material goods, including water. As the right is
limited to the absolute minimum, its fulfilment
cannot be restricted under any circumstances. Thus
even though the scope of protection is strongly
limited (see the chapter on legal content above III.1.),
at least the protection afforded to those in need gives
rise to an individually enforceable fundamental right
to be provided with material goods, namely also with
water.58
This serious conceptual shortcoming in international
and South African law of the human right to water’s
function as protective shield cannot fully be
compensated by the fact that both legal orders
presume that the State is per se in violation of its
duties if no immediate actions are taken to fulfil at
least the absolute minimal content of the human
right to water. In this regard the ESCR Committee
specified that ‘while the Covenant provides for
progressive realisation and acknowledges the
constraints due to the limits of available resources,
it also imposes various obligations which are of
immediate effect’.59 Besides the obligation that states
move as expeditiously and effectively as possible
towards the full realisation of the rights, states must
also live up to specific minimum core obligations,
such as the immediate provision of the minimum
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Judgement of 18 March 2005; Amstutz, note 54 above,
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in der Schweiz, Im Rahmen der Bundesverfassung, der
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Obligations (article 2 para 1 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) para 1,
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 14
December 1990, UN Doc. E/1991/23 (1990) [hereafter
GC 3].
core content of each right.60 In a similar approach,
the South African Constitutional Court has included
in its reasonableness review the obligation for the
administration to provide for short-term measures
to ensure that desperate people in need are afforded
relief.61
For the distribution of water under the public
interest clause the ‘unequal protection problem’
might or might not have consequences, depending
on the attitude of the decision-makers. If in their
procedure of attributing priority to certain water
users the decision-makers base themselves upon the
normative content of the human right to water, no
unequal treatment of demands of water supply for
already existing or new domestic water users will
occur. But if on the contrary the decision-makers
base their decision upon the state’s obligations to
provide access to water, no clear-cut obligation to
attribute priority to the water needs of the have-nots
persists. Consequently, the state has the duty to treat
water for basic needs with priority. But no individual
claim for priority treatment in decisions can be
deducted from the human right to water in
international and in South African law. Thus the
human right to water as protective shield provides
only incomplete protection for those that need it
most. On the contrary Switzerland is a positive
example guaranteeing all three dimensions (respect,
protect, fulfil) necessary to the effective fulfilment
of the human right to water’s function as protective
shield in the public interest clause. Consequently in
Switzerland, the human right to water can effectively
be considered as fulfilling its function for every single
human being that might be concerned by decisions
on water distribution (although with very limited
scope). In South African law the legal fiction of
absolute protection for basic water needs in water
distribution by complementing the public interest
clause with the human right to water is deceiving.
Feigning individual legal protection - by
complementing the public interest clause with the
human right to water - where there is little or none
exposes particularly vulnerable individual’s interests
to the risk of being trumped by other interests at
stake. Employing the human right to water as
general place holder despite its shortcomings renders
decision-making on water distribution under the
public interest clause precarious.
3.3 Environmental Protection
The third critical conceptual limitation of the human
right to water as protective shield is linked to its
inherent anthropocentricity. As explained before,
safeguarding healthy watersheds is a key to secure
access to water in the long term. As the local
availability of clean water is dependent upon the
regional and global water cycle (especially in the
long-term), only a holistic concept of the (natural)
environment seems appropriate for the conservation
of the water resources.62 The deterioration of the
water resources in the long term affects the access
to water and the living conditions of individuals.This
said, the human right to water is conceived as
anthropocentric right. Such a concept is by no means
capable of advocating for the holistic protection of
the water resources. By ‘holistic’ I mean the idea
that access to water is dependent upon the
availability of clean water, which again is linked to
environmental health. In contrast to holistic
approaches to the protection of the environment,
the human right to water is conceptually limited to
the protection of human beings. It can thus only
accord punctual protection of water resources in case
human beings are directly affected in the satisfaction
of their basic needs.
According to the ESCR Committee’s interpretation,
the human right to water comprehends certain
aspects that relate to environmental protection, such
as to prevent threats to health from unsafe and toxic
water conditions or to ensure the protection of
drinking water sources.63 Also in Swiss and South
African constitutional law the duty to respect and
protect drinking water sources can implicitly be
derived from the human right to water on
constitutional level.64 But its use for environmental
protection is limited to cases in which human beings’
Law, Environment and Development Journal
32
60 See GC 3, id., para 9 f.
61 See Grootboom (CC), note 36 above, para [44]; Mazibuko
(CC), note 36 above, para [144]; Klug, note 36 above and
Liebenberg, note 50 above, at 151 ff and 163 ff.
62 See Beyerlin & Marauhn, note 2 above, at 87 and Cullet,
note 22 above, at 234 f.
63 See GC 15, note 38 above, paras 8 and 29.
64 For South Africa, see Brand, note 36 above, at 27 f. For
Switzerland, see Rüegger, note 42 above, at 44.
adequate access to safe water is imperilled. They,
thus, do not attribute protection to the environment
as such, but only in its relation to human needs.65
Even though the human right to water in
international, South African and Swiss law can be
instrumental as protective shield in a limited number
of cases, no priority for a holistic approach to water
environmental protection within the public interest
clause can be derived thereof.66 Emphasis on this
aspect must come from other legal instruments, such
as the environmental and water protection law, the
law on hydraulic forces or international
environmental and water law.
The South African human right to water is subject
to the same limited environmental protection. Still
the legal situation in South Africa differs
considerably due to the fact that the South African
Constitution in section 24 specifically guarantees the
right to a healthy environment.67 By according
protection to the environment as such, this right goes
beyond the protection of interests that are directly
linked to human needs.68 The guarantee of a
constitutionally protected and justiciable right to a
healthy environment fills an important gap in
decisions under the public interest clause and thus
complements the human right to water in an
important point. In comparison to conventional
approaches to environmental protection of water on
legislative level, the constitutional right acts as
complementary protective shield in decisions under
the public interest clause. The importance of such a
right is threefold: first, all legislation must be in
conformity with the higher ranking constitutional
norm. Second, the administration is not only held
to treat the environment as prioritarian user, but
has a constitutionally entrenched obligation to do
so. This priority prevails even against legislation that
might leave the administration lee-way for decisions
that would lead to a different appreciation of the
various interests at stake. And third, the behaviour
of the administration can be submitted to judicial
review by representatives of the civil society,
exerting more control on how the administration
makes use of its discretionary power in decisions
under the public interest clause.
Relying on the combination of statutory
environmental law and the inherently
anthropocentric constitutional guarantee of the right
to water for the protection of the water resources
seems inappropriate.69 The statutory provisions
enjoy no priority treatment, the possibilities to
challenge the administration’s decision remain
limited. The human right to water can only in a very
limited set of situations provide the normative bases
for preferential treatment of the environment as
such. The quest for a more profound and holistic
relationship between human beings and nature
cannot be accommodated therein. Even though the
human right to water can effectively exert a
protective function under some circumstances,
further reaching constitutionally entrenched
environmental rights would be an important
complement. The added value of its use in addition
to the human right to water is rudimentary
illustrated by the South African case law.
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CONCLUSION
In its first part the paper dealt with the way water
regimes are currently structured and the role the
public interest clause plays therein. It then went on
to identify the uses of water to be considered as
corresponding to the interests of the public and to
analyse how competing interests are to be balanced
against each other. It then highlighted the protective
function of the human right to water in decisions
on water distribution under the public interest
clause. An analysis of the human right to water as
guaranteed in international, Swiss and South African
law made it apparent that the human right to water
has certain shortcomings in regard to the fulfilment
of its protective function. In the process of water
distribution, the human right to water as conceived
in the three legal orders ensures protection of
domestic water users under some, but not all
circumstances. The shortcomings of the human right
to water as protective shield mainly concern three
aspects: first, the human right to water is
conceptually limited to a minimal guarantee; second,
the interests of those users whose access to water is
not yet sufficient do not receive adequate legal
protection; and third the human right to water is
conceptually anthropocentric and remains too
limited in its scope to accredit the primordial
interests in water conservation with legal protection
complying with the importance of the matter.
In spite of the shortcomings of the human right to
water as protective shield, and from what this
analysis revealed of the issue’s legal aspects, the
human right to water remains an important factor
within the complex pattern in which access to water
is determined. Even though little case law exists so
far (few constitutional law cases in South Africa,
only one case making reference to the constitutional
protection of the right in Switzerland) they all point
into the direction that the human right to water,
besides its shortcomings, is a necessary complement
to the statutory law regulating the distribution of
water under the public interest clause. The human
right to water first of all sets clear priorities in the
licensing procedure under the public interest clause.
Instead of being one amongst many, the interests of
domestic water users have to be considered as
absolute priority by the administration. And second,
the right gives a tool to question decisions on water
distribution by the administration by legal means.
Even if (as is the case in South Africa) no individual
right to be treated as such can be claimed, at least
judicial review of the administration’s decisions can
be enforced. And third, the analysis of the human
right to water’s protective function points out that
fragmentary legal protection of basic human needs
might expose vulnerable water users’ interests to
inadequate consideration in the licensing procedure
when competing against other water user’s interests.
Consciousness of the importance of the human right
to water in decisions on water distribution under
the public interest clause should encourage evolving
the concept of the human right to water towards
comprehensive constitutional protection of basic
human needs. Efforts should particularly be to work
towards: the recognition of the human right to
water’s full normative content in its relative
dimension; the achievement of equal protection of
the haves and the have-nots; the substantive material
review by the judiciary of the legislation’s
conformity with constitutional law; the recognition
of an independent constitutional right to a healthy
environment as a complement to the human right
to water.
The social responsibility charged on the human right
to water as protective shield under the public interest
clause justifies an informed approach to its use in
decisions on water distribution. It is irresponsive to
employ the legal fiction that the human right to
water guarantees the preferential treatment of basic
human needs when competing against other water
users under the public interest clause while this is
actually not always the case. Feigning legal
protection where there is little or none exposes
particularly vulnerable individual to the risk of being
trumped by other interests at stake. Knowledge
about the possible consequences of employing the
human right to water as general place holder despite
its shortcomings will hopefully encourage the
establishment of alternative and further reaching
individual protection as an indispensable
complement to the public interest clause.
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